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DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO INSPECT INVESTIGATIVE
FILES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
"It has long been a truism, possibly at times more honored in the
breach than in the observance, that it is as much the duty of the
State to acquit the innocent as to convict the guilty. To put it
another way the interest of the State in a criminal prosecution 'is
not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.'... Justice
can only be done when the truth is made known."*
The right of a criminal defendant to inspect the investigative files
of law enforcement agencies is not a well-settled principle of American
law. The English common law did not recognize any right of inspec-
tion in criminal proceedings. 1 The Supreme Court of the United States
has held that a denial of pre-trial inspection of matter in the posses-
sion of the state is not a violation of any rights guaranteed under the
Constitution.2 Any right of inspection, therefore, must be predicated
upon statute, court rule, or court decision.
In State v. Whites the Supreme Court of Iowa did not allow the
defendant an unlimited right to inspect police files but did remand
the case with direction to the trial court to hold an in camera hearing
of police radio tapes, in the presence of -the prosecuting attorney and
the defendant's counsel, in order to determine if the tapes contained
information germane to the defense of entrapment. The police radio
had been used to effect a rendezvous of officers in an area where an
informant had advised that a burglary was to occur. The officers ob-
served three men arrive in a car and get out. Two of the men entered
a nearby building and the third returned to the car and drove away.
The officers searched the building and found the defendant and an-
other man hiding there. The driver of the car was not apprehended.
At the trial defendant claimed entrapment by the informant and the
police acting in concert. Although the trial court did not require
the State to reveal the name of the informant, 4 it was apparent that
defendant was pointing to the driver of the car as the informant.
Prior to the trial the defendant had made a written request to
*State v. Lavallee, 122 Vt. 75, 163 A.2d 856, 858 (g6o).
'Rex v. Holland, 4 Durn. & East. 691 (K.B. 1792).
'Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
3151 N.W.2d 552 (Iowa 1967).
'The Supreme Court has held that the decision to withhold or to disclose an
informant's identity rests in the discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., McCray
v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); Roviario v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957); Scher
v. United States, 3% U.S. 251 (1938).
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inspect the radio tapes, in the presence of officials, to determine if
they contained information which would support his defense of en-
trapment. The request was denied, as was a similar request made at
the beginning of the trial. The supreme court stated that the unusual
circumstances of the case-reliance on an informant by the State and
failure to apprehend the driver of the car-demanded that the trial
court hear the tapes in order to determine if inspection would be al-
lowed.
The right of the criminal defendant to inspect the files of law en-
forcement agencies is important in two stages of criminal proceedings:
(1) prior to trial as a means of discovery, and (2) during trial as a
means of possible impeachment of the state's witnesses.
Inspection as a Means of Discovery
Although the common law rule of no discovery has been exten-
sively modified,5 there are some jurisdictions which adhere to this
rule.6 In these jurisdictions, of course, the defendant has no right to
inspect any material in the files of law enforcement agencies.
Several jurisdictions have enacted statutes7 or promulgated court
rules8 which allow limited discovery in criminal proceedings. These
statutes and rules vary from allowing pre-trial inspection of only the
defendant's written confession 9 to the inspection of "the evidence of
the state."'10 In State v. Shouse," the Supreme Court of Florida in-
'a F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 671 (12th ed. 1955).
eSee, e.g., Idaho Galena Min. Co. v. Judge of Dist. Ct., 47 Idaho 195, 273 P. 952
(1929); Abdell v. Commonwealth, 173 Va. 458, 2 S.E.2d 293 (1939); State v. Miller, 35
Wis. 2d 454, 151 N.W.2d 157 (1967).
7See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 925.04 (Supp. 1965); LA. REV. STAT. § 44:3 (1950);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2441 (Supp. 1966); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-21-9 (1953).
8See, e.g., COLO. R. CGmt. P. 16; DEL. SUPER. Cr. (CRiM.) R. 16; MD. R. (CuhIt.)
P. 728.
9
LA. REV. STAT. § 44:3 (1950). Title 44 of the Louisiana Revised Statuteg allows
for the inspection of public records and documents. Section 3 of Title 44 reads as
follows:
Records held by investigating officer or agency.
A. This Chapter shall not apply to public records when they are held by
any sheriff, district attorney, police officer, investigator or investigating
agency of the state as evidence in the investigation or prosecution of a
criminal charge, until after the public records have been used in open
court or the criminal charge has been finally disposed of....
This section has been held to deny inspection of all items in possession of the state
with the -exception of the defendant's confession. See State v. Johnson, 249 La.
950, 192 So. 2d 135 (1966).
"FLA. STAT. ANN. § 925.04 (Supp. 1965).
2177 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1965).
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terpreted the latter language as being applicable only to those docu-
ments and objects which are themselves admissible in evidence. This
necessarily precludes inspection of such hearsay items as police re-
ports and pre-trial statements of witnesses.
12
Pre-trial discovery in federal criminal prosecutions is provided for
by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 3 Under Rule 16 certain
enumerated items are to be produced for inspection upon the defen-
dant's request; but reports, memoranda, or other internal documents
made by government agents in connection with the investigative
process are specifically exempted from pre-trial inspection. The Jencks
Act,' 4 while concerned primarily with production of material for
purposes of impeachment, specifically provides that statements or
reports will not be made available for inspection until the appropriate
witness has testified on direct examination in open court.
Even in jurisdictions which allow pre-trial criminal discovery, a
defendant has not been allowed an unlimited right of inspection
of material contained in police files. The courts in State ex rel. Sadler v.
Lackey' 5 and Cash v. Superior Court'16 adopted a rule which invests
the the trial court with discretion as to whether the defendant will
be allowed to inspect law enforcement files.
In Sadler, the defendant was charged with manslaughter. A small
child was struck and killed by an automobile. There were no clues
from which the police could ascertain the identity of the responsible
person. When he arrived at the scene of the accident, the defendant,
who was unaware that he had struck the child, advised the investigat-
ing officer that he had passed the area at approximately the time the
child was struck. Scrapings were taken from the defendant's car and
sent to the FBI laboratory for scientific analysis. On the basis of the
examination results, the defendant was charged with manslaughter.
Prior .to the trial the defendant requested that he be allowed to ex-
amine the examination report. The trial court granted the request, and
the State sought a writ of prohibition against the trial court's ordering
the report produced for the defendant. The appellate court denied
the writ of prohibition, stating that it was within the discretion of the
"Police reports and pre-trial statements of witnesses are inadmissible for proof
of the truth of the matter stated therein. See, e.g., Gordon v. State, 34 Ala. App.
278, 41 So. 2d 6o8 (1949) (unsigned stenographic transcript); Fite v. State, 158
Tex. Crim. 611, 259 S.W.2d 198 (1953) (police reports). See also 2 F. WHARTON,
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 561 (12th ed. 1955).
"FFD. R. CRIm. P. 16.
118 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964).
"319 P.2d 61o (Okla. Crim. App. 1957).
1153 Cal. 2d 72, 346 P.2d 407 (1959).
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trial court as to when pre-trial inspection of such items was to be
allowed. It was the opinion of the appellate court that since the in-
formation was gained only because of the defendant's cooperation,
justice demanded that he be allowed to see the report.
In Cash, the defendant was charged with attempted burglary and
solicitation to commit burglary. The man he allegedly solicited was a
police officer. The officer tape-recorded his conversations with the
defendant. Prior to trial the defendant requested that he be allowed
to inspect the tapes on the ground that he was unable to recall the
content of the conversations. The trial court denied the request. The
appellate court reversed the ruling of the trial court, stating that
the decision as to whether to allow pre-trial inspection was at the
discretion of the trial court, and that the trial court's decision would
be reversed only if its discretion was abused. The court found that
the ground stated by the defendant was sufficient to warrant inspec-
tion and pointed out that the fact that entrapment was a possible
defense was an even more compelling reason.
Other jurisdictions have adopted rules similar to that adopted by
Sadler and Cash, investing the trial court with a power of discretion
as to pre-trial inspection. 17 Under this discretionary rule, a defend-
ant must show that circumstances are such that "substantial justice
requires" that he be allowed to inspect police files.' 8 His request also
must be narrow in scope, aimed only at those items which are material,
for he will not be allowed to go on "a tour of investigation"'19 or a
"fishing expedition." 20
There are jurisdictions which completely deny a defendant the
right to inspect material within police files on the ground that such
material is the work product of the prosecuting attorney.21 This
work-product doctrine is derived22 from the civil litigation work-
product doctrine announced in Hickman v. Taylor.2a
"'See, e.g., Kinder v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.2d 782 (Ky. 1955); Commonwealth
v. Galvin, 323 Mass. 205, 8o N.E.2d 825 (1948); People v. Maranian, 359 Mich. 361,
1o2 N.W.2d 568 (196o); Cramer v. State, 145 Neb. 88, 15 N.W.2d 323 (1944); Pinana
v. State, 76 Nev. 274, 352 P.2d 824 (1960); People v. Marshall, 5 App. Div. 2d 352,
172 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1958); State v. Goldberg, 261 N.C. 181, 134 S.E.2d 334 (1964);
State v. Thompson, 54 Wash. 2d 100, 338 P.2d 3i9 (1959).
"State v. Hill, 23 Ohio Op. 2d 255, 191 IN.E.2d 235 (C.P. 1963).
"State v. District Court, 135 Mont. 545, 342 P.2d 1071 (1959)-
"People v. Wilkins, 135 Cal. App. 2d 371, 287 P.2d 555 (1955).
"See, e.g., State v. Superior Court, 99 Ariz. 382, 409 P.2d 547 (1966); Peel v.
State, 154 So. 2d 91o (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963), cert. denied, 3o8 U.S. 986 (1965);
State v. Superior Court, io6 N.H. 228, 208 A.2d 832 (f965 ).
-2People v. Valdez, 203 Cal. App. 2d 559, 21 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1962). See generally
Note, 1966 Wash. U.L.Q. 321.
"329 U.S. 495 (1947)-
1968]
74 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXV
In State v. Tune24 the court alluded to the work-product doctrine
in not allowing the defendant to inspect police files and presented
an extended discussion of why the liberal rules of civil discovery
should not be applied in criminal prosecutions. The court pointed
out that the stakes were much higher in criminal prosecutions than
in civil litigations, for a criminal defendant stands to lose his personal
freedom, and even his life in extreme cases. It was the opinion of the
court that such high stakes provided the criminal defendant with a
great incentive to commit perjury and intimidate witnesses and that
to allow discovery of police records would completely undermine the
effectiveness of law enforcement agencies and would be contrary to
public policy.
The courts which have transposed the civil-litigation work-pro-
duct doctrine to criminal prosecutions appear to have overlooked, or
failed to consider fully, one of the fundamental differences between
civil litigations and criminal prosecutions. Civil litigations are actions
between private parties who are on a relatively equal footing in re-
gard to their access to investigative facilities. Criminal prosecutions
are actions by the state against one or more of its citizens. The state
has a veritable storehouse of investigative means and personnel at
its disposal, while the criminal defendant's ability to retain investi-
gative services is dependent entirely upon his financial status.
Nothwithstanding State v. Tune,25 it is submitted that the fact
that the stakes are higher in criminal prosecutions is the single most
compelling reason to adopt a more liberal and flexible attitude con-
cerning insepection of police files by a defendant. Because the stakes
are so high, all reasonable methods of ascertaining the truth should
be allowed, including the defendant's inspection of police files when
the circumstances of the case warrant it. The mere possibility that
some defendants or their counsel will yield to the temptation to mis-
use the information gained is not sufficient reason to deny arbitrarily
all defendants inspection of law enforcement files.
'413 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953). The court denied inspection of any material
in the possession of the State, including the defendant's confession, but indicated
that if the defendant could show unusual and exceptional circumstances he might
be allowed to inspect matter in police files. New Jersey has relaxed its earlier rule
against discovery of any materials in the possession of the State. See State v. Cook,
43 N.J. 56o, 2o6 A.2d 359 (1965) (medical reports); State v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133,
145 A.2d 313 (958) (defendant's confession). However, inspection of police reports
and statements of other witnesses is still not allowed.
"1,3 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953).
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Inspection As A Source of Possible Impeachment
As a general rule of evidence, one may use the prior inconsistent
statement of an adverse witness to impeach that witness. 26 The prob-
lem which arises in this respect in criminal prosecutions is that the
statement of a witness against the defendant is in the possession and
control of the state. The criminal defendant does not know if a prior
inconsistent statement does in fact exist.
In Jencks v. United States27 the Supreme Court held that an FBI
report prepared by a witness who testified for the government had
to be produced for the defendant's inspection. The defendant was not
required to show that the report was material to the testimony of
the witness or that it was in any way inconsistent with the witness'
sworn testimony. The only showing that the defendant was required
to make was that the report did in fact exist; and, in this case, the
witness had admitted such in his testimony. It is to be noted that
the Jencks case was not applicable to state criminal proceedings.
28
After the ruling in Jencks, Congress enacted the Jencks Act29 for the
purpose of controlling the production of statements and reports for
impeachment purposes in federal criminal prosecutions. Under the Act,
a statement or report shall be produced only after the witness has testi-
fied on direct examination, and then only if it is material to the
substance of the witness' sworn testimony. If the government objects
to the production of the report on the grounds that it contains nothing
material to the witness' testimony, the requested document must be
submitted to the trial judge for his inspection and decision as to its
materiality. The judge is also to delete any portions of a document
which are not material and to deliver any material portions to the
defendant for his inspection and use. The procedure prescribed by the
Act has been held to be constitutional and not in violation of any of
the rights guaranteed to an accused.30
Several states have adopted a rule which, while within the general
rule of allowing impeachment by prior inconsistent statements, in
fact deprives a defendant of any right of inspection of reports or
m3 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 916 (12th ed. 1955).
"353 U.S. 657 (1957), noted in 15 WASH & LEE. L. REV. 88 (1958).
2See, e.g., Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959); Sanders v. State, 278
Ala. 453, 179 So. 2d 35 (1965); McKenzie v. State, 236 Md. 597, 204 A.2d 678 (1964).
08 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964). For rulings as to what constitutes a "statement" see
Mims v. United States, 332. F.2d 944 (oth Cir.), cert. denied, 379 US. 888 (1964);
United States v. Papworth, 256 F.2d 125 (sth Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 854 (1958).
"*West v. United States, 274 F.2d 885 (6th Cir. 196o), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 819
(1961).
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statements held by the state.31 Before he will be allowed to inspect
such reports or statements, the defendant must show that they con-
tain material statements which are contradictory to the sworn testi-
mony of the witness. As early as 1807, Chief Justice Marshall, in
United States v. Burr,32 recognized the absurdity of such a rule when
he said: "Now, if a paper be in possession of the opposite party, what
statement of its contents or applicability can be expected from the
person who claims its production, he not precisely knowing its con-
tents?... He cannot be expected to make such a statement." 33
In denying inspection for purposes of impeachment, courts have
given the same reasons as those given for denying inspection for pur-
poses of discovery.34 In State v. Oswald3 5 a police officer admitted on
the stand that he used a report that he had prepared to refresh his
memory the day before the trial. The court denied the defendant
the right to inspect the report saying: "To permit its use by the defen-
dant would divulge information concerning other crimes in the
processes of investigation, and destroy the effectiveness of the investi-
gative and enforcement process of the state."36 However, other courts
have adopted procedures to meet the objection raised in Oswald.37 In
State v. Tranchell3s the defendant requested to see the notebook
of a police officer who testified in court. The officer advised the court
that the notebook contained notes not related to the defendant's case.
The trial court ordered production of those portions of the notebook
dealing with the defendant's case. The appellate court upheld the
trial court's ruling. The procedure adopted by the court in Tranchell
is consistent with that perscribed for federal courts by the Jencks Act.39
There is merit in the contention that a defendant should not be
allowed to inspect reports which will disclose information about crimes
other than the one with which he is charged. Yet a complete denial
of inspection is not consistent with the general rule regarding the use
31See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 239 Ind. 372, 156 N.E.2d 384 (1959); State v.
Martin, 25o La. 705, 198 So. 2d 897 (1967); State v. Hale, 371 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. 1963).
125 F. Cas. 187 (No. 14,694) (C.CiD. Va. 1807).
1Id. at 191.
O'See, e.g., People v. Santora, 51 Cal. App. 2d 707, 125 P.2d 6o6 (1942) (con-
fidential, inadmissible in evidence); State v. Zimnaruk, 128 Conn. 124, 20 A.2d
613 (1941) (privileged, public policy); State v. Hill, 193 Kan. 512, 394 P.2d o6
(1964) (adverse effect on law enforcement, confidential material).
S197 Kan. 251, 417 P.2d 261 (1966).
"Id. at 270.
"rSee, e.g., Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487 (1963); State v. Tranchell, 412
P.2d 520 (Ore. 1966); State v. Richards, 21 Wis. 2d 622, 124 N.W.2d 684 (1963).
"412 P.2d 520 (Ore. 1966).
0918 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964).
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of a prior inconsistent statement for impeachment. The procedure
adopted by the court in Tranchell40 and set forth in the Jencks Act
adequately protects the state's interest in the investigative process and
allows a court to proceed in accordance with the rule allowing im-
peachment by inconsistent statements.
Conclusion
In discussing whether a state has to reveal the name of an in-
formant,41 the Supreme Court set forth the most reasonable solution
of the problem involved in the right of a criminal defendant to inspect
the files of law enforcement agencies. "No fixed rule with respect to
disclosure is justifiable. The problem is one that calls for balancing
the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the
individual's right to prepare his defense." 42
In any criminal proceeding there is but one method of balancing
two equally valid, opposing interests, and that is to invest the trial
court with a broad power of discretion-reversing its decision only
when that power is abused. The court in State v. White invested the
trial court with such discretion, with the added requirement that it
hold a hearing on material prior to exercising that discretion. If, after
holding such a hearing, the court decides that justice demands inspec-
tion, it may order the material produced. This rule works to protect
the integrity of the investigative and enforcement processes and at the
same time works to protect the rights of the criminal defendant. It
is equally applicable whether inspection is sought as a means of dis-
covery or as a means of possible impeachment.
CARR L. KINDER, JR.
1°State v. Tranchell, 412 P.2d 520 (Ore. 1966).
"2Roviario v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
11Id. at 62.
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